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"CONSTRUCTIVE VOLUNTARY QUIT" DISQUALIFI-




Every State has enacted a statute providing in substance that
a worker who voluntarily leaves employment without good cause
must be denied unemployment insurance payments during part or
all of his ensuing unemployment.1 An individual to whom payments
are denied by reason of such a statute is commonly said to have
sustained a "voluntary quit" disqualification. The statutes are part
of a Federal-State unemployment insurance program administered
by the State Governments through Federal grants, made under
Title III of the Social Security Act,2 which pay for costs of program
administration. They have a significant impact, as will presently
appear, on a broad range of contemporary employer-employee re-
lationships.3 The impact presumably was not intended when the
program was first established, since it was initially conceived as
* Ph.B. 1953, LL.B. 1950, University of North Dakota. Office of the Solicitor, United
States Department of Labor; formerly Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
The views expressed are those of the author and this paper does not represent an ex-
pression of views by the United States Department of Labor.
1. "An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the di-
rector finds that he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause .... "
CALI. UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANCE CODE § 1256 (a reasonably typical provision). Roughly
half the States restrict "good cause" to cause arising from the individual's employment.
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS Et-3 (Bes No. U-141, 1965). In
states with statutes of the latter type, to illustrate the significance of the distinction, an
unemployed individual will receive unemployment insurance if he quits because of justified
dissatisfaction with his employer but not if he leaves for a personal reason such as de-
sire to remove to a more favorable climate for reasons of health. Such "restricted" good
cause provisions have been sharply criticized by the Bureau of Employment Security,
which administers the Federal end of the employment security program. See UNEMPLOY-
MENT INsURANcE LEGISLATIVE POLICY 62 (Bes No. U-212, 1962). The period of disqualifi-
cation imposed under the "voluntary quit" statutes varies widely from State to State, in
some jurisdictions extending over the duration of a worker's unemployment and in others
being limited to periods of approximately six weeks.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1964), 49 STAT. 626 (1935), as amended.
3. General discussions of the employment security program may be found in symposia,
8 VAND. L. Rmv. 179-474 (1955) ; 10 OHIO STATE L.J. 117-254 (1949) ; 55 YALE L.J. 1-263
(1945); 3 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 1-172 (1936). Other useful studies are HARER & MUR-
RAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1966); Griffiths, Charity, v.
Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963); ALT-
MAN, AvAIABILIrY FOR WORK (1950); Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation in
Labor Disputes, 49 YALE L.J. 461 (1940) ; and Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Un-
employment Insurance Legislation. 38 COL. L. REv. 858 (1938).
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a social insurance system protecting the worker and community
from the harmful social and economic consequences of unemploy-
ment rather than as a device for directly regulating relations be-
tween labor and management.4 Nevertheless, the system is so
designed that employers have a direct financial interest in the con-
ditions under which unemployment insurance is granted or denied
to employees, and application of the "voluntary quit" disqualification
is a matter of State rather than Federal law.5 The predictable
result is that a substantial controversy surrounds the operation of
these statutes.
One of the numerous facets of the argument centers about a
recurring problem:
A worker is employed pursuant to a contract, which he may
negotiate with his employer either in person or through the
agency of a union, providing for termination of his em-
ployment upon the occurrence of a future contingency. If
the contingency occurs and unemployment results, does the
fact the worker voluntarily agreed to the contract provide
a legal basis for imposition of a "voluntary quit" disqualifi-
cation upon him?
The contingency stipulated in the contract may take many forms.
To suggest the major possibilities, the contract may provide that
employment will terminate (or be terminated) when the worker
attains a specified age of retirement,6  marries,7 becomes preg-
nant,8 earns more than a specified amount during a single year,'
is "bumped" from his job by a worker with greater seniority, 10 is
no longer needed for the employer's temporary purpose," or when
the employer's plant closes for vacation or inventory. 2 The fore-
going enumeration is by no means exhaustive. 18 Since new wrinkles
4. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economio Objectives, 55 YALE L.J.
1, 2-4 (1945) ; Harrison, Statutory Purpose and Involuntary Unemployment, 55 YALE L.J.
117 (1945).
5. The financial interest possessed by employers arises from the fact that if his for-
mer employee receives unemployment insurance an employer's "experience rating" will
be unfavorably affected in all but a comparative handful of States. This in turn will
affect the employer's liability to pay contributions (taxes) under the State unemployment
insurance law. The desirability of the experience rating system has been the subject of
mixed reactions. See Griffiths, note 3 supra4 at 368, n. 51; Temple & Nowacek, Experience
Rating: Its Objectiv,&, Problems and Economic Implications, 8 VAND. L. REv. 376 (1955) ;
Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945). As to the point that Federal law
vests substantial discretion in the States as to questions of disqualifications, see HEARINGS
BEFORE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., on HMR. REP. 8282, Vol. 1,
page 172, August 9, 1965; 79 CONG. REc. 9271, June 14, 1935.
6. See "Retirement," Part II, infra.
7. See "Marriage," Part III, infra,
8. See "Pregnancy," Part IV, infra.
9. See "Share-the-Work" Plans, Part VII, infra.
10. See "Bumping," Part VI, infra.
11. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commissioner v. American National Bank &
Trust Co., 367 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1963).
12. See "Vacations," Part V, infra.
13. To illustrate, a number of recent decisions have taken the view that an employee
who violates an employer's rules and is discharged in consequence Is subject to disqualifi-
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are constantly developing in the employment relation, ingenuity or
the simple course of events may at any time produce contracts
which stipulate additional contingencies as a basis for termination
of employment and thus open up new areas of the basic issue. 14
Despite this seeming diversity of fact situations, certain legal
issues invariably are encountered with respect to any case falling
within the general classification above indicated. These issues are:
(1) Is the worker's unemployment voluntary within the
meaning of the statute?
(2) If so, did the worker have legally sufficient cause under
the statute for his election to separate himself from
employment?
(3) Is denial of unemployment insurance benefits on the
basis of such a contract provision consistent with statu-
tory provisions forbidding waiver by private agreement
of the right to unemployment insurance?
15
It is convenient in the discussion which follows to treat these issues
jointly, since under the statutes pertaining to the "voluntary quit"
disqualification the questions of volition and cause have, or ought
to have, a close relationship; it is not possible to determine ac-
curately whether the act of a worker in leaving his job was volun-
tary unless one takes account of the causes which led to his action. 6
Similarly, although the anti-waiver provision has its own legal back-
ground, 17 virtually every case hereinafter cited in connection with
cation as a "voluntary quit" on the theory that his vountary action in breaking the rules
constituted implied assent to his separation from employment. Cases of this nature are
not analyzed in this paper since regardless of the ground on mhich the disqualification is
asserted (obviously the proper disqualification is for misconduct in connection with work)
there exists no doubt as to whether benefits are properly payable in such cases.
14. A unique example Is Sarja v. Iron Range Resources & Rehaibilitation, 274 Minn.
458, 144 N.W.2d 377 (1966), in which it was held that a State civil service employee
suspended without pay for disciplinary purposes left employment voluntarily, on the basis
of "strict principles of contract and agency," because at the time he accepted State em-
ployment he also accepted the conditions of employment set forth by the State statutes
and civil service rules. His previous assent to such terms of employment made his sus-
pension, in the view of the Court, "voluntary."
15. Like the "voluntary quit" statutes described in footnote 1, statutes forbidding
waiver of the right to unemployment insurance are found in every State. They are com-
monly derived from a pair of draft bills circulated by the Social Security Board con-
currently with the effective date of the Social Security Act of 1935 to help the States
enact unemployment insurance laws meeting the requirements of the Federal law. Section
15 of both draft bills provided that: "No agreement by an individual to waive, release or
commute his right to benefits or any other rights under this act shall be valid .... "
16. "The test of what is voluntary is more than what is done on the worker's own mo-
tion which, like the short journey to the electric chair of the man who walks erect, may
be the product of impelling circumstance." Harrison, supra note 4, at 122.
17. When the program was established in 1935 there was substantial precedent to the
effect that the operation of statutes intended to affect employer-employee relations could
be nullified by contracts between employers and employees. See Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital, 261 U.S. 525 (1926) (holding minimum-wage leyislation unconstitutional on a free-
dom-of-contract rationale) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (deemed controlling
authority in the Adkins case). In the light of these precedents, insertion of an anti-
waiver clause In the various State unemployment insurance laws was an obvious act of
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the so-called "factual matrix" rule actually turns on the appli-
cation of the anti-waiver statute.
II. RETIREMENT
1. Factors peculiar to the retirement cases.
There are several reasons why the problem outlined in the
preceding section assumes its sharpest form in connection with
separations from employment which occur pursuant to an employer's
rule or a provision in a collective bargaining contract requiring
employee retirement on attainment of a specified age. s From an
employer's standpoint such cases often involve substantial economic
issues. This is because employee retirement is increasingly associ-
ated with the grant of a private pension to the retiree. 9 Logically
this should not affect entitlement to unemployment insurance any
more than the claimant's possession of a home, car, or bank ac-
count,20 but the decisions provide ample evidence that this circum-
legal prudence. The constitutional situation as it existed in 1935 furnishes one explana-
tion of the reason why the unemployment insurance program was established on a Fed-
eral-State basis. It was by no means certain that even the limited program of Federal
grants contemplated by Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935 would survive the
test of constitutionality. (It was ultimately upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 [1937], by a 5-4 decision). The benefit-payment provisions of the unemployment
insurance program obviously could be defended far more readily from constitutional at-
tack If enacted by the States under their reserved powers than If enacted by the Con-
gress. Adkins and Lochner are, of course, no longer influential. Compare, Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) ; see also, Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in
Constitutional Law, 29 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1916); Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum
Wage Legislation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 545 (1924).
18. It has been said the "split of authority is most clearly discernible" in connection
with the mandatory retirement cases. Annotation, 90 A.L.R.2d 835, 855 (1963). On such
cases generally, see Notes, 39 B.U.L. REv. 124 (1959) ; 59 Con. L. REv. 209 (1959) ; 67
HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1954) ; 53 Mic. L. REv. 849 (1955) ; 43 MINN. L REv. 168 (1958)
28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332 (1953) ; and 44 VA. L. REv. 1343 (1958).
19. "Best estimates reflect that approximately $30 biliUon are presently held in pen-
sion-plan portfolios alone." SEN. REp. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sesa, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. Nnws 4137, 4139 (1958). See Note 23, infra, for additional figures. The economic
issue normally will not be of comparable importance from the standpoint of the individual
unemployment insurance claimant. The claimant's only concern is with a limited period
of entitlement to unemployment insurance payments, invariably of an amount too small
to repay substantial litigation.
20. Since unemployment compensation is a form of social insurance rather than a pro-
gram of relief or welfare assistance, entitlement to unemployment Insurance may not be
conditioned, consistently with Federal law, upon a test of means or need. See Burns, supra
note 4, at 2; compare, Mandelker, The Need Test in General Assistance, 41 VA. L. Rev.
893 (1955). The Secretary of Labor, who has statutory responsibility for administration
of the Federal law, has so found. See the Secretary's Finding in the Matter of Section 1,
Chapter 125, L. 1963, of the State of South Dakota, January 3, 1964 (published by the
Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Department of Labor, as an attachment to Unem-
ployment Insurance Program Letter No. 746, January 8, 1964). The claimant's possession
of private financial assets or resources is thus irrelevant in determining his entitlement
to unemployment compensation. Since statutes in many States require the amount of un-
employment insurance payments to be reduced by the amount of employer-contributed
pensions received by a claimant, the basis on which the Federal prohibition of a means or
needs test can be reconciled with these State laws is of considerable interest Such pen-
sion payments are treated as a form of wages-i.e., they are deemed to constitute com-
pensation for past services rendered. "Regardless of the form they take, the employers'
share of the cost of these (pension] plans or the benefits the employers provide are a
form of compensation." SEN. REp. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 U. S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nnws 4137, 4139 (1958). That the State statutes as to pensions are not at present
deemed inconsistent with Federal standards, see, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways
and Means on H.R. 8282, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1. pp. 176-77, August 9, 1965.
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stance is in fact often deemed relevant by the courts.2 1 The reason
for employer persistence in stressing the pension factor is readily
understandable, since to the extent that mandatorily retired em-
ployees are automatically disqualified for unemployment insurance
as "voluntary quits" employers are thereby enabled to offset part
of the cost of their industrial pension systems by reduction of their
tax liability under State unemployment insurance laws.2 2 The rapid
growth of private employee pension plans indicates that this is in
many instances a substantial accounting item.
28
The mandatory retirement cases are unique in respects other
than the presence of the pension factor. In common with the rest
of humanity, a worker has no option about growing old. Hence the
mandatory retirement cases deal with a contingency which must
occur if employment continues long enough. Accordingly they may
be distinguished from cases involving such unemployment-pro-
ducing contingencies as marriage or pregnancy, where at least
some element of free choice is present. Similarly, it may be pointed
out that the mandatory retirement cases customarily involve a
relatively complete severance of the employment relation. In cases
involving layoffs for vacation, pregnancy, or because of "share-the-
work" plans, it is customary to discover that some incidents of the
employment relation often persist in an attenuated form despite the
worker's technical status of unemployment. 24 In the mandatory
retirement cases, by contrast, there is normally no prospect that
the worker ever will regain employment with his former employer
once he has passed the prescribed age limit and been separated
from his job.
21. The growth of such plans was mentioned as early as 1950 in one of the first cases
dealing with this situation. See, Keystone Mining Co. v. Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super.
256, 75 A.2d 3 (1950). See also note 23, infra.
22. This is a consequence of the experience rating system described in note 5, supra.
23. Figures on the growth of private pension plans for employees indicate that in 1930
there were 72(0 such plans in the United States covering 2,400,000 workers. By 1956 these
had become a minimum of 23,000 plans covering 14,300,000 workers. SENATE REP. No.
1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4137, 4141 (1958). As of 1960,
HousE REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 U. S. CODS CoNo. & AD. NEws 1532, 1535
(1962), reported 25,000 such plans but gave the coverage at 80,000,000 workers, an ap-
parent error presumably caused by the inclusion of figures pertaining also to employee
welfare plans (e.g., Blue Cross and Blu~e Shield) in the pension coverage total. An un-
official estimate in 1967 was that as of 1965 there were 33,000 plans, in many instances
covering more than one employer, registered with the U. S. Department of Labor, covering
approximately 26,000,000 workers. It may be pointed out that the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1964), 72 STAT. 997 (1958) as amended by
76 STAT. 35 (1962), does not require disclosure of pension plans covering less than 26 em-
ployees. And annual reports are required only if a plan covers 100 or more workers. 29
U.S.C. § 306(a) (1964); 76 STAT. 36 (1962). See also note 19, supra.
24. For purpose of unemployment insurance, an individual is ordinarily deemed un-
employed in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which
no wages are payable to him. CoMPARIsoN OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAws,
Par. 300 (BES No. U-141, 1965). Thus a worker laid off to await recall to work after
a plant reopens may be unemployed within the meaning of a State unemployment insur-
ance law despite the fact both worker and employer contemplate continuance of the em-
ployment relation.
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2. Cases imposing disqualification (herein of the agency theory).
Initially it was the general view that the eligibility for un-
employment benefits of a worker separated from employment after
passing the age of retirement specified by his employer or by a
collective bargaining agreement depended solely on whether the
worker remained a bona fide member of the labor force - i.e.,
whether he was genuinely available for employment and able to
work.25 The view that such an individual was subject to disqualifi-
cation on the ground he had left employment voluntarily without
good cause gained currency only after Bergseth v. Zinsmaster
Baking Co., 28 decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1958
and generally regarded as the leading case for the result it reaches.
The two claimants in Bergseth were employed by a firm which
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with their union
requiring employee retirement at age 65.27 Since both claimants
were 67 when the agreement took effect they were told their em-
ployment would be ended. Each accepted $200 in severance pay2 8
and filed claims for unemployment insurance. The claims were
denied on the ground they were disqualified as "voluntary quits."
The Court reasoned that since the union was the agent of the claim-
ants in negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
the action of the union in stipulating 65 as the age of employee
retirement constituted a voluntary agreement by the claimants to
quit work, thus rendering their ensuing separations from employ-
ment voluntary also.
29
It is clear the Court found the case troublesome. This is not
surprising, since it may be pointed out that in the absence of the
union agreement these separations would not have been disquali-
fying and that the effect of the agreement on the entitlement of the
claimants to compensation obviously was not contemplated by the
union. In any event, the opinion was studded with a large array
of citations deemed to present cognate situations and drew a vigor-
ous dissent. Although the majority opinion superficially turned on a
25. See, e.g., Fleizig v, Board of Review, 412 Ill. 49, 104 N.E.2d 818 (1952); Bennett
v. Review Board, 122 Ind. App. 37, 102 N.E.2d 383 (1951) ; Keystone Mining Co. v. Board
of Review, 167 Pa. Super. 256, 75 A.2d 3 (19501); Hall v. Board of Review, 160 Pa. Super.
65, 49 A.2d 872 (1946).
26. 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958), noted 59 COL. L. REV. 209 (1959) ; 43 MIN.
L. Rav. 1343 (1958).
27. Neither claimant atended the union meeting at which approval of the retirement
plan was voted.
28. Each claimant had 14 years of service with the company. To qualify for pensions
each needed 15 years.
29. "By and large, if the contract contains reasonable provisions encompassing ap-
propriate subjects for collective bargaining and is properly negotiated by the authorized
agent and properly ratified by the union membership, it will be deemed to be the volun-
tary act of each individual member of the union, including any dissenters. The ratification
forecloses any subsequent claim by an employee that actions which are incumbent upon
him under the terms of the contract are involuntary and against his will." Bergseth v.
Zinsmaster Baking Company, 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1958).
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theory of union agency, the ultimate holding also rests quite plainly
on a number of subsidiary propositions:
(1) That a "voluntary quit" may be the product of a mutual
agreement between employer and employee; 0
(2) That entitlement to compensation-a statutory matter-
may be determined by reference to the terms of a
private contract; 31 and
(3) That to deny unemployment compensation to a manda-
torily retired claimant who is receiving a pension pre-
vents a duplication of benefits, since pensions and un-
employment insurance payments both serve the identi-
cal purpose of replacing wage loss caused by unemploy-
ment.3 2
Each of these propositions is sufficiently intriguing to warrant
analysis, but the subsequent history of the case also merits attention.
Quite obviously, the decision in Bergseth was written in care-
fully qualified terms indicating judicial desire to avoid interference
with the processes of collective bargaining as long as these proc-
esses did not overreach the workers or impose unreasonable hard-
ship on them. That this is so is manifest from the fact the opinion
attempted to provide safeguards assuring that in future cases the
worker's "consent" would be truly "voluntary." The opinion de-
clared, for example, that union contracts would be deemed binding
on individual workers represented by the union only if the con-
tract provisions were "reasonable" and involved "appropriate sub-
jects for collective bargaining," and even then proper negotiation
and ratification of the agreement were deemed necessary. 3 The
Court went so far in this connection as to affirmatively determine
that the pension and severance pay provisions of the contract in
the case before it appeared reasonable.34 The opinion likewise
stressed the Court's reluctance to infringe on the liberty of contract
enjoyed by the parties. It was meticulously noted that the Court
wished to avoid a result which "would destroy the principles of
collective bargaining and render union-management contracts mean-
ingless.
' 3 5
All this sounds fair enough, and obviously it cannot be said
that such an approach to the problem was completely implausible.
Collective bargaining agreements presumably are drafted by nego-
30. See text to notes 54-57 infra.
31. Cf. note 17, supra.
32. See text to notes 58-65 infra.
33. See note 29, supra.
34. Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Company, 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172, 178 (1958).
35. Id. at 63, 89 N.W.2d 177.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tiators possessing a reasonable degree of expertise in labor-manage-
ment relations and are executed by parties having reasonable parity
of bargaining power. Hence, a decision testing the scope of a
State's unemployment insurance system by reference to such con-
tracts, while possibly open to criticism as delegating legislative
authority to private parties, could not be said to leave workers
completely devoid of protection. The Court's opinion thus placed
the case for result reached in its most favorable light. The result
was that the decision rapidly produced a polarization of profes-
sional opinion which gained it a substantial number of adherents, 86
produced legislation in several States to avoid its effects, 87 and
remains influential even at the present time.88
But it illustrates the true difficulty inherent in decisions of this
type to observe that within three years after the precedent was
first established that it is possible by private contract to secure
the automatic disqualification of mandatory retirees as "voluntary
quits," every concession to the worker which the case nominally
made had either been rescinded, ignored, or substantially qualified.
The requirement that the employee's "consent" be embodied in a
"reasonable" union-management contract, properly negotiated and
freely ratified by the union membership, had been eliminated. The
Court's theory as to the union's status as an agent of the worker
for purposes of determining when a separation from employment
is voluntary3 9 had been found unnecessary. In Stream v. Con-
tinental Machines40 the Court held explicitly that a worker retired
solely by reason of an employer's rule established without nego-
tiations of any kind likewise was disqualified for benefits on the
authority of the Bergseth case. It was the Court's view that em-
ployees, by accepting or retaining employment with knowledge of
such an employer's rule or policy, embodied it by acquiescence
in their contracts of employment. 41 The logic of Bergseth accord-
36. Ball Brothers Co. v. Review Board, 135 Ind. App. 68, (1963) (now overruled);
Commissioner v. Reynolds Metals Co. 360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962) ; Commissioner v.
Kroehler Mfg. Co., 352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961) ; Lamont v. Director of Employment Secur-
ity, 337 Mass. 328, 149 N.E.2d 372 (1959), noted 59 Cot. L. RaV. 209 (1959) ; Ivy v.
Dudley, 6 Ohio St.2d 261, 217 N.E.2d 875 (1966); Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., 4 Ohio
App.2d 95, 212 N.E.2d 425 (1965): Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc.
41, 205 N.E.2d 608 (1964). For contra cases, see note 66, infra.
37. "The employer, upon the retirement of an individual from employment pursuant
to a pension program, plan or agreement requiring retirement on the ground of age, and
any labor union or association which Is a party to any such program, plan, or agreement,
shall notify such individual in writing that he is not, by reason of such retirement, dis-
qualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits." MASS. GEN. LAws, c.
151A, § 25. See also CAL. U. I. CoDE § 1256; BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. § 52-1539 (Cum.
Supp. 1966), to substantially the same effect.
38. The total number of decisions, administrative and unreported, following Bergseth
v. Zinsmaster Baking Company, supra note 34, is not known with accuracy.
39. See note 29, spra.
40. 261 Minn. 289, 111 N.W.2d 785 (1961).
41. ".It is our opinion that claimants . . . by continuing their employment for several
years after the adoption of the retirement policy . . . with knowledge of such policy, at
least impliedly agreed to accept the policy . . . It is fundamental that the relationship
316
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ingly led inexorably to the conclusion that a separation from em-
ployment required by the terms of any contract between employee
and employer was likewise "voluntary." The progression is note-
worthy. One witnesses in these cases a court moving by successive
stages from applying social legislation embodying an important
public interest by reference to:
(a) the terms of a publicly-enacted statute to:
(b) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between
private parties assumed to possess reasonably equiva-
lent bargaining power to
(c) an employer's substantially uncontrolled discretion in
dealing with unorganized employees.
If the legislation thus committed to the tender mercies of the law
of contract had been a minimum wage law, or a law regulating
hours of work, or conditions of safety in employment, the ana-
chronistic character of the theory applied by the Court would have
been readily apparent.4 2 Here was Bergseth's true significance.
In the light of this history, which has been substantially dupli-
cated in a number of other States,4 3 it is difficult to escape the
of master and servant rests upon contract, express or implied; that the contract may be
implied from the acts of the parties and circumstances; and that it may be partly ex-
presed in words and partly implied from facts and circumstances . . . Where an employee
accepts or retains employment with knowledge of new or changed terms or conditions, a
contract results emboding the new or changed terms or conditions." Id. at 788.
42. See aupra note 17. "It is possible," one commentator has observed, "that the ap-
plication of contract principles to the collective bargaining system is exercising a stultify-
ing effect upon the evolutioin of industrial order." Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining
and the Evolution of Contract, 48 COL. L. REv. 829 (1948). A better illustration of the
thesis than the cases under discussion would be difficult to find.
43. The cases in Kentucky have many elements of similarity. In Commissioner v.
Kroehler Mfg. Co., 352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961), a claimant separated from employment
under a collective bargaining contract with retirement-and-pension provisions was held
disqualified as a "voluntary quit" where (a) the employee had an option not to join the
plan in the first place, (b) the employee also had an option to withdraw from it after
joining, (c) the employee had an option to retire early on a reduced ptnsion, and (d) the
employer, under the contract, could have kept the claimant at work had the claimant so
requested. Like Bergseth, this must be deemed a qualified acceptance of the "constructive
voluntary quit" idea. But within a year after Kroehler was decided, Commissioner v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962), held that a claimant mandatorily re-
tired under a collective bargaining contract was automatically disqualified for benefits
as a "voluntary quit" despite the apparent absence of any of the contract options which
had been deemed significant when Kroehler was decided. The reductio ad absurdum of this
line of cases was reached thereafter when an employer logically argued that a discharged
employee should be disqualified as a "voluntary quit" on the authority of the foregoing
cases because he knew when he took the Job that his employment was going to be tem-
porary. At this point the Court perceived that something was wrong, and granted bene-
fits. Commissioner v. National Bank & Trust Co., 367 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1963). Although
the Court observed that "At first blush it appears that the reasoning of the Kroehler
case will necessarily dictate the result in this one" (367 S.W.2d at 262), it managed to
draw a distinction. The claimant "did not agree to leave the work" because " had the
need for the work continued he would have continued to perform." This, of course, was
true of the claimants in the Reynolds case as well.
Ohio went off on its own unique decisional track. After wavering for several years
x~nder the influence of Bergseth, the Ohio Supreme Court ultimately decided in a decision
notable for ambiguity of phrasing, that a claimant mandatorily retired under a union
contract could be disqualified on the theory he had been discharged "for just cause." Ivy
V. Dudley, 6 Ohio St.2d 261, 217 N.E.2d 875 (1966) ; See alao Marcum v. Ohio Match Co.,
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conclusion that the theory of union agency on which Bergseth and
similar decisions rest is unsound and should be discarded. That
the theory totally inverts the intended effect of collective bargain-
ing agreements so far as workers and unions are concerned, and
imparts to the union's representative capacity (which is actually
conferred by statute rather than contract) in dealing with questions
of employment a scope pertaining to matters of unemployment
which neither principal nor agent desires it to have seems tolerably
clear.4 4 Such, in any event, has been the view of the legal com-
mentators, 5 who have supported, in the language of one decision,
the line of cases opposed to Bergseth "overwhelmingly. ' 4
3. The statutory test in the retirement cases.
The instant one rejects the agency theory as a valid tool for
analysis of the problem under discussion, many issues become a
great deal clearer. It becomes possible to perceive, for example,
that to treat the question whether a separation from employment
is or is not "voluntary" as the controlling test of decision in cases
involving the "voluntary quit" disqualification ignores an important
qualification. It should be emphasized that the fact unemployment
may be voluntary in its inception does not mean it is not com-
pensable.4 7 Voluntary unemployment, by the plain language of the
4 Ohio App.2d 95, 212 N.E.2d 425 (1965). This is in essence a holding that an employee
with lifelong record of faithful service may be disqualified on the same basis as an em-
ployee dismissed for drunkenness, insubordination, or theft. A possible reason for this
remarkable result is suggested in note 58, infra.
Indiana first adopted the Bergseth rule, Ball Brothers Co. v. Review Board, 135 Ind.
App. 68, 189 N.E.2d 429 (1963), then enacted legislation against it, BURNS IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-1539 (Cum. Supp. 1966), and ultimately overruled its initial holding, Jenkins v. Re-
view Board, 211 N.E.2d 42 (Ind. App. 1965)); Unverzagt v. Review Board, 211 N.E.2d
631 (Ind. App. 1965).
44. "Such [collective bargaining] agreements usually restrict the employer's right to
dismiss at will until the employee reaches a certain age; they thus protect the employee
from arbitrary dismissal. It would be anomalous to say that, in gaining this protection
against his employer, an employee has lost a benefit which he otherwise would receive
from the State--the right to rceive unemployment benefits if dismissed-on the theory
that he has voluntarily agreed to quit." Warner v. Board of Review, 396 Pa. 545, 153
A.2d 906, 909 (1959).
45. See Fineshriber, Effect of Collective Bargaining Agreements on Voluntary Quits,
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGAL AFFAIRS CoNFERENcE 78, 93 (Regions III, VI and IX, 1961) ;
59 CoL. L. RPv. 209, 213 (1959) ; 67 HARv. L. Rsv. 1437, 1438 (1954) ; 34 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 466, 469 (1959). Contra: 44 VA. L. Rsv. 1333, 1346 (1958), which asserts that the
Bergaeth case "adheres to the fundamental principles embodied in the laws of Agency and
Contracts."
46. Employment Security Commission v. Magma Copper Co., 90 Ariz. 104, 366 P.2d 84,
88 n.7 (1961).
47. The misconception to the opposite effect stems partly from the fact that the draft
bills circulated by the Social Security Board in 1935 (see supra note 15) contained a
declaration of State "public policy" which asserted that it was the public policy to pro-
tect workers against "involuntary unemployment," and also referred to "persons unem-
ployed through no fault of their own." These provisions were not intended to regulate
payment or denial of benefits in individual cases. They were intended to make clear the
constitutionality of the statutes by demonstrating their basis in the State's power to
legislate as to the public health, welfare, safety and morals. In 1935 serious doubt as to
constitutionality existed. See supra note 17. When it subsequently became evident that
the phrases "involuntary unemployment" and "persons unemployed through no fault of
their own" were being misapplied, and were resulting in denial of benefits to workers
eligible for benefits under the specific eligibility and disqualification provisions in the
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statutes, is non-compensable only if the worker left his job without
sufficient cause.48 The cases imposing "voluntary quit" disqualifi-
cations on mandatory retirees often ignore the issue of causation
entirely.4 9
Moreover, the proposition that a mandatorily retired employee
has "voluntarily" left his employment involves highly dubious
theories both as to what is "voluntary" and as to what constitutes
a "leaving." The idea that an action is voluntary implies in the
normal usage of language that the actor possesses a meaningful
freedom of choice with respect to it.5 0 Does such freedom of choice
exist? In jurisdictions which automaticallly disqualify mandatory
retirees it is impossible for a worker to retain either his employ-
ment or his right to unemployment insurance by any voluntary
action within his power. It may be argued that the worker may
refuse to consent to the retirement clause in the contract at the
time of its execution. But if the contract is a collective bargaining
agreement the action of the majority of workers in ratifying it is
treated by the courts as binding upon dissenters,51 and if the plant
is not unionized the worker's action in refusing the employer's terms
of employment would constitute either a voluntary quitting or a
refusal of offered employment and thereby also result in the worker's
disqualification 5 2 precisely the result such a worker would be seek-
ing to avoid. 58 Thus it is immaterial in jurisdictions following this
view whether the employee accepts or rejects the assertedly "vol-
untary" contract, since regardless of the alternative he chooses his
rights under the statute are lost.
State laws, such phrases were deleted from the draft bills. Unfortunately, they had been
widely enacted before their susceptibility to misconstruction became apparent. The story
is traced in Harrison, supra note 4, at 118-19. See also, Simrell, Employer Fault V. Gen-
eral Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
48. See note 1 aupra.
49. E.g., Stream v. Continental Machines, supra note 40, which treats the "good
cause" provision of the statute as seemingly non-existent and fails entirely to analyze its
application to the problem before the court. It recently has been suggested that whether
a State should follow the Bergeath rule depends on whether it has a "general" or "re-
stricted" good cause provision (see aupra note 1) in its voluntary quit statute. Jenkins
v. Review Board, 211 N.E.2d 42 (Ind. App. 1965). As to this, see text to note 158 infra.
50. Watson v. United States Rubber Co., 24 N.J. 598, 138 A.2d 328, 330 (1957) ;
Kempfer, Dtsqualifioation for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147, 154-55;
34 NoTam DAME LAw. 466, 469 (1959); Supra note 16.
51. Supra note 29.
52. Cf., Hessler v. American Television & Radio Co., 258 Minn. 541, 104 N.W.2d 876
(1960) (employees who left employment by reason of modest decrease in wage rates
held voluntary quits) ; Egely v. Board of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 141, 159 A.2d 574 (1960)
(employee who quite rather than accept transfer to lower-paid position held disqualified).
Nor does it make a difference if, in such a situation, the employee is regarded as having
refused an offer of new work. Disqualification may be anticipated anyhow. See, Watson
v. United States Rubber Co., 24 N.J. 598, 133 A.2d 328, 330 (1957) (dictum).
53. No case has been found in the research supporting this paper involving a separa-
tion from employment initiated by a worker solely because of unwillingness to accept an
employer's retirement plan. It is believed unrealistic to expect such separations to occur,
since the worker who would sacrifice present employment and accrued retirement rights
merely to test entitlement to a few weeks of unemployment insurance would be distinctly
unusual.
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Similarly it appears inaccurate to classify a separation from
employment resulting from a mandatory retirement plan as a
"leaving" or "quit" within accepted usage. In terms of legal concept
a separation from employment is a "leaving" or "quit" only if it
is initiated by the unilateral action of the employee.5 4 It would be
difficult to classify such a separation as voluntary if this were not
so, since to be genuinely voluntary an action must be unconstrained
by interference and unimpelled by another's influence. 55 There has
been little difficulty in recognizing the corollary proposition that a
separation from employment produced by an employer's unilateral
action is properly classifiable as a "dismissal" or "discharge." 51
Since this is so, where a separation from employment is the result,
not of a unilateral decision by either an employer or an employee,
but of a bilateral agreement to terminate employment,5 7 it is clearly
a strained construction to classify it as either a quit or a discharge.
It falls within neither category and is actually a separation from
employment by mutual consent. On this basis such separations do
not fall within the intendment of the "voluntary quit" disqualification.
4. The Wage-Replacement Theory.
Disqualification of mandatory retirees is sometimes defended
on the argument that it serves to avoid a duplication of benefits
at the expense of the employer, who otherwise is said to be compelled
to pay the worker twice, once in the form of a pension and once in
the form of a charge to his experience rating record which will
produce an increase in taxes.58 This particular argument appears
54. Employment Security Commission v. Magma Cpper Co., 90 Ariz. 104, 366 P.2d 84,
86 (1961) ; Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287, 289 (1953)
Warner Co. v. Board of Review, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906, 909 (1959).
55. Kempfer, supra note 50 at 154.
56. "The word 'dismissal' . . . connotes an affirmative action on the part of the em-
ployer in initiating the separation .... Where there is mere passive acquiescence by the
employer in a voluntary retirement pursuant to a contractual retirement plan . . . there
is no 'dismissal' within the purview of the [Unemployment Compensation] Act." Dubois
v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 150 Me. 494, 114 A.2d 359, 363-64 (1955).
57. That a bilateral agreement is present in such cases is recognized even by courts
which hold that mandatory retirement is diaqualifying for unemployment insurance pur-
poses. See, Lamont v. Director of Employment Security, 337 Mass. 328, 149 N.E.2d 372, 374
(1958) ("The agreement is that of both parties.")
58. This position is not stated explicitly in the Bergseth case but evidently was con-
sidered by the court, since the dissent points out that: "A pension agreement entered into
between an employer and its union should not be considered as a substitute for benefits
created by social legislation to which all employees are entitled." Bergseth v. Zinsmaster
Baking Co., 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172, 178 (1958). For decisions more or less openly
basing disqualification of mandatory retirees on the wage-replacement theory, see, Ball
Brothers Co. v. Review Board, 135 Ind. App. 68, 189 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1963) (now over-
ruled) (noting the effect of benefit payments on the employer's experience rating);
Leach v. Columbus Coated Fabrics Co., 1 Ohio Misc. 41, 205 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1964) (de-
claring that an employer would be Indirectly penalized for establishing a pension plan if
he also had to pay unemployment compensation to retirees). It is possible the unique
view ultimately reached by Ohio with respect to mandatory retirement-see, supra note
43-may reflect a complex aspect of this argument. Ivy v. Dudley, 6 Ohio St.2d 261, 217
N.E.2d 875 (1966), the critical decision, is written in ambiguous terms which apparently
preserve the court's option to classfy mandatory retirees either as voluntary quits or an
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to be inaccurately predicated on the theory, popularized by Larson
in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation,-9 that all compensa-
tion received by employees as a replacement for wage-loss, regard-
less of the cause of the wage-loss, should be coordinated so as to
award only a single wage-loss benefit.
6 0
Whether one accepts or questions the wage-replacement theory,
6 1
it would not support the disqualification of mandatory retirees on
the basis of the Bergseth rule. There are four reasons for this
conclusion. First, courts which follow the Bergseth case deny un-
employment compensation to mandatorily retired claimants regard-
less of whether they are receiving any other compensation for the
wage-loss caused by their forced retirement. As Bergseth illustrates,
the cases deny benefits whether the claimant is entitled to a pension
or not. Thus any coordination of benefits achieved by holdings of
this nature is accidental and depends on a wholly extraneous factor.
Second, Larson carefully points out that the coordination of benefits
involves "many detailed questions . . . certain to arise which
can only be handled by carefully-considered legislation. ' 6 2 Thus
the judicial process is not the appropriate medium through which
to establish the desired coordination. Third, Larson's analysis per-
tains to publicly-financed wage-loss benefits rather than payments
having been discharged for cause. The Secretary of Labor determines the type of situa-
tion in which a State, consistently with § 3303 (a) (1) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
may omit charges to employer experience rating accounts when unemployment insurance
is paid to workers. If the Secretary of Labor should alter his present interpretation of
§ 3303(a) (1), the opinion in Ivy v. Dudley conceivably could be interpreted by the Ohio
court as being based on a theory which would allow omission of charges notwithstanding
the change in the Federal law.
59. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION C. XVIII (1961) ; see also Larson, The Wel-
fare State and Workmen's Compensation, 5 NACCA L.J. 18 (1950); Larson, The Future
of Workmen's Compensation, 6 NACCA L.J. 18 (1950); and also Riesenfeld, The Place of
Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and Policies of Protection Against Wage-
Loss, 8 VAND. L. Rxv. 218 (1955).
60. "Wage-loss legislation is designed to restore to the worker a portion, such as one-
half to two-thirds, of wages lost due to the three major causes of wage-loss; physical
disability, economic unemployment, and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of wage
loss; the cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable.
Now if a workman undergoes a period of wage loss due to all three conditions, it does
not follow that he should receive three sets of benefits simultaneously and thereby re-
cover more than his actual wage. He is experiencing only one wage loss and, in any
logical system, should receive only one wage-loss benefit. This conclusion is inevitable,
once it is recognized that workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, non-
occupational sickness and disability insurance, and old age and survivor's insurance are
all part of a system based upon a common principle. If this is denied, then all coordina-
tion becomes impossible and social legislation becomes a grab-bag of assorted urelated
benefits." 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 97.10 (1961).
61. Is it true, as the preceding footnote suggests, that society pays workmen's compen-
sation to a man who has lost an arm in an industrial accident solely to replace the pay-
checks he has lost while hospitalized and convalescing? Note that such a formulation
leaves no room for the concept that pain and loss of future earning capacity are com-
pensable, and often may have the effect, since replacement of lost wages is not to be
total, of dropping the worker and his family to the poverty level, with socially undesir-
able consequences. Whatever may be the raison d'etre of workmen's compensation, it may
be suggested that unemployment insurance is not wholly a wage-loss scheme. See Burns,
supra note 4, at 11-12. The coordination-of-benefits argument does not explicitly state the
necessity for assurance that the desired coordination of benefits would occur at an ac-
ceptable economic level. There is no such assurance at present.
62. Larson, op. cit. supra, note 60, § 97.20.
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under private pension plans.63 This last is a distinction of some
importance. To deny unemployment insurance to a worker because
he is in substance the beneficiary of a retirement trust fund, even
when done indirectly through a strained construction of the "volun-
tary quit" disqualification, is difficult to distinguish from denying
benefits to him because he has achieved a particular level of private
income. It is a fundamental characteristic of the unemployment
insurance program that entitlement to benefits may not be made
contingent on such a test of "means" or "need."' "6 The program
is one of insurance rather than charity. Fourth, in many instances
the argument that the employer is paying for the pension is simply
untrue. Often the worker is merely getting back in the form of a
pension money which he himself has contributed to the pension
fund in the form of a payroll deduction."5
5. Cases awarding benefits (herein of the factual matrix rule).
In view of the numerous objections to which the rule of Bergseth
v. Zinsmaster Baking Co. is subject, it is not surprising that the
majority of reported decisions reach an opposing result which is
believed far sounder. 6  The leading case on the benefit-payment
side is probably Campbell Soup Company v. Board of Review,
6 7
decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1953. The claimants
in Campbell, like the claimants in Bergseth, were separated from
employment under a compulsory retirement provision in a collective
bargaining agreement despite their requests to remain in employ-
ment. A New Jersey Superior Court imposed "voluntary quit" dis-
qualifications on the theory the contract made the separations com-
pulsory so far as the employer was concerned and equally removed
the separations "from the realm of involuntariness as to the em-
ployees."6 8 Reversing this result, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the agreement of a union to such a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement could not bind individual workers in pro-
63. "As to private pensions, whether provided by the employer, union, or the Indi-
vidual's own purchase, there is ordinarily no occasion for reduction of compensation bene-
fits." Larson, op. cit. supra note 60, § 97.33. The reference is to workmen's compensation
benefits but is logically applicable to unemployment insurance also.
64. Supro note 20.
65. See IxT. Rnv. CODE § 72(d) ; cf. Barclay v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 569, 95 A.2d
797 (1953) ; Yeager V. Board of Review, 196 Pa. Super. 162, 173 A.2d 802 (1961).
66. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Thorne, 41 Ala. App. 331, 133 So.2d 709, cert. denied, 272
Ala. 709, 133 So.2d 713 (1961); Employment Security Commission v. Magma Copper Co.,
90 Ariz. 104, 366 P.2d 84 (1961); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemployment In-
surance Appeals Board, 180 Cal. App.2d 649, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1960) (separation for
pregnancy); Dubois v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 150 Me. 494, 114 A.2d
359 (1955); Jenkins v. Review Board, 211 N.E.2d 42 (Ind. App. 1965); Campbell Soup
Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953); Warner Co. v. Board of
Review, 396 Pa. 545, 158 A.2d 906 (1959); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Board of Review,
190 Pa. Super 408, 154 A.2d 336 (1959). For contra cases, see supra note 36.
67. 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953).
68. Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review. 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A.2d 514, 518 (1953).
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ceedings to collect unemployment insurance because if the contract
were so interpreted it would amount to an "advance surrender" of
the right to unemployment compensation. Such an advance sur-
render, in the view of the Court, would be inconsistent with the
section of New Jersey's law prohibiting waiver or release of benefit
rights. The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, indicated fur-
ther that only the factual situation existing at the time of termi-
nation of employment, rather than the contract entered into at its
inception, could be considered in determining whether benefits were
payable.
If the inquiry is isolated to the time of termination, plainly
none of the claimants left voluntarily in the sense that on
his own he willed and intended at the time to leave his job.
. . .The Legislature plainly intended that the reach of the
[voluntary quit] subsection was to be limited to separa-
tions where the decision whether to go or to stay lay at
the time with the worker alone and, even then, to bar him
only if he left his work without good cause. The claimants
here did not choose of their own volition to leave the employ
of Campbell Soup Company when they were separated. They
left because they had no alternative but to submit to the
employer's retirement policy, however that policy as pres-
ently constituted was originated. Their leaving in compliance
with the policy was therefore involuntary for the purposes
of the statute. 69
It is the restriction of inquiry to the time of separation from em-
ployment indicated by this opinion which is its most striking char-
acteristic. Commonly known as the "factual matrix" rule,7 0 the
restriction cuts deep and its reason is not invariably apparent on
the face of the opinions. The question reasonably may be asked:
If an employee's representative has insisted on an employment
contract with a mandatory retirement provision, why should the
employer be denied the right to introduce evidence of this fact to
demonstrate that the employee's retirement actually resulted from
his own choice? The answer is that the factual matrix rule is
the logical corollary of two separate propositions:
(1) That an individual may not by contract foreclose him-
self of the right to claim and receive unemployment
benefits when the conditions set by law for payment of
those benefits occur, and
(2) that to prove that a separation resulted from a mutual
69. Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287, 289 (1953).
70. The term is derived from Warner Co. v. Board of Review, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d
906, 909 (1959), a hotly-contested case wherein the court declared "the factual matrix
at the time of separation should govern."
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bargain falls short of the required proof that it was
produced by the decision of the worker alone.
71
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the factual matrix rule
is supported by highly practical considerations of simplicity of proof
and administration. What is being litigated in an unemployment
compensation proceeding is the statutory right of a single out-of-
work individual to a relatively small amount of cash, not the proper
interpretation of a contract. To require detailed exploration of the
negotiations preceding the formation of an employment contract,
conceivably executed many years earlier 7 2 before deciding whether
a worker is entitled to unemployment insurance is to insist in many
cases on a practical impossibility.73 An occasional claimant might
be able to make some sort of showing on the point; but the un-
employment insurance system operates on a mass coverage basis,
the great bulk of the claims must be decided administratively,
and simple criteria of entitlement are a necessity for its successful
operation.
An additional point may be mentioned. Jurisdictions using the
factual matrix rule apply it equally to union and non-union workers,
precisely as is true of jurisdictions following the agency theory
ennunciated in the Bergseth case.7 4 Pretty clearly this is a necessary
outcome if the courts are to avoid the establishment of conditions
of entitlement based on the state of a claimant's union membership.
In jurisdictions following the Bergseth rule, however, the result is
to create a direct financial incentive for imposition by employers
through contract of restrictive conditions of employment on non-
unionized workers; this is so because the employer's experience
rating, and hence his tax liability, will become more favorable
precisely to the extent that the employer can show that separations
from his employ occur pursuant to such contract provisions and
71. Supra note 57.
72. Note that Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Company, note 34 supra, was not typi-
cal in this respect. In Bergseth the execution of thd contract and the separations were
virtually contemporaneous in point of time; but the contract deemed critical in deter-
mining worker entitlement to benefits in jurisdictions following the Bergseth rule con-
ceivably could have been written 30 years before the worker files his claim.
73. "The pressures of the collective bargaining process are too complex to permit this
over-simplified theory to govern a determination here. They would require an inquiry
into each case to determine the position of each side at the bargaining table, and even
then a clearcut answer would undoubtedly not be forthcoming." Warner Co. v. Board of
Review, 369 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906, 909 (1958). Compare Ball Brothers Co. v. Board of
Review, 135 Ind. App. 68, 189 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1963), where the court stated: "The ap-
pellant-employer may have deliberately sacrificed other considerations in order to obtain
a voluntary retirement age in the contract because the payment of unemployment com-
pensation to these retired individuals would change the company experience rating."
(Emphasis supplied). Note the significance of the word "May". It appears to indicate the
court based its decision on a speculation rather than on evidence.
74. Compare Atlantic Refining Co. v. Board of Review, 190 Pa. Super. 408, 154 A.2d
336 (1959) with Stream v. Continental Machines, supra.
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hence are legally voluntary. 75 Since the factual matrix rule treats
such contract provisions as irrelevant for purposes of determining
entitlement to benefits, it destroys this incentive and thus eliminates
one source of pressure toward job insecurity and unfavorable
employment conditions.
The factual matrix rule does not mean, of course, that all
employees retiring pursuant to a retirement plan must in every
case be deemed eligible for benefits. Obviously in a substantial
percentage of the cases the retirement of an employee from the
employ of his employer is, for practical purposes, the end of his
working career. Hence it remains true that before the retiree may
be found eligible for benefits there must be a finding that he re-
mains genuinely attached to the labor force-i.e., he must be avail-
able for work and able to work. 76 Nor are the terms of the contract
between the worker and employer totally irrelevant in determining
whether a separation is solely the product of the worker's own
choice. Such contracts often contain options which cast a revealing
light on the subsequent actions of the parties. It seems clear that
the existence of a contractual option on the part of an employee
who approaches the age of retirement to either accept a separation
or continue in employment beyond the normal age of retirement
has a bearing on the question of his entitlement to unemployment
insurance, since if a man can keep his job and elects to retire
anyhow it is obvious that his unemployment legitimately may be
classified as voluntary. 7 Similarly, if an employer has the option
to retain an employee or retire him, and elects to retire him, the
separation from employment clearly is not the result of the worker's
unilateral decision and hence is involuntary from the worker's stand-
point. 78 This last point, it may be suggested, is particularly per-
tinent where retirement is mandatory only because the employer,
having unilaterally established it as a rule, is unwilling to alter it.
III. MARRIAGE
Although a split of authority is found in the mandatory retire-
ment cases, decisions involving the question whether the "voluntary
quit" disqualification applies to a female 79 employee who marries
and is separated from employment because her employer has a
rule, or has entered into a union contract, forbidding the retention
75. How varied and ingenious such contract provisions can be is indicated by the
text to notes 6 through 14, supra.
76. Text to note 25 supra.
77. Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953); Blum-
berg v. Board of Review, 191 Pa. Super. 243, 159 A.2d 243 (1960). See also, Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commissioner v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 352 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1961).
78. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Thorne, 41 Ala. App. 331, 133 So.2d 709, cert. denied, 272
272 Ala. 709, 133 So.2d 713 (1961) ; Ferrelli v. Leach, 186 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio App. 1962).
79. No case has been found involving a male.
326 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in employment of married women display substantial uniformity.
As of this writing the claimants have lost every reported case.
An excellent illustration is Brown v. Southern Airways, 0 decided
by a Louisiana court in 1964. The claimant was an airline stewardess
who married and resigned her position in deference to a company
rule requiring stewardesses to remain single as a condition of em-
ployment. In denying her claim for unemployment insurance the
Court stated:
The general rule is that employees who marry, and there-
after have resigned because of a company rule prohibiting
continuation of employment after marriage, are held to have
voluntarily quit their work without good cause, and are not
eligible for unemployment compensation. The cases . . . are
uniformly to the effect that a company rule, whether prom-
ulgated unilaterally, or in a collective bargaining agreement,
providing for the discharge of female employees upon mar-
riage, is a reasonable and valid condition of employment,
the enforcement of which does not create liability for un-
employment compensation. 8'
Although this opinion attempted to reinforce the result by pointing
to technical conditions in the airline industry, 2 the Court's argu-
ment in this respect is not reflected in regulations or statutes per-
taining to the industry 3 and thus appears to have dubious aspects.
8 4
Even if valid, however, the argument based on considerations
peculair to aircraft operation would merely indicate that airlines
following this rule were pursuing reasonable operating procedures
80. 170 So.2d 245 (La. App. 1964), aIfd without opinion, 247 La. 361, 171 So.2d 478
(1965).
81. 170 So.2d at 246-47.
82. "The ban against married airline stewardesses is common to the industry. The
duties required of a stewardess are such that, if she should become pregnant, she might
endanger herself and her unborn child, as well as the passengers under her care. An ill
or disabled stewardess cannot properly perform her duties during flight which are es-
sential to the comfort and safety of passengers In times of emergency the stewardess is
expected to take the lead in saving lives; hence, she must be in first-rate physical con-
dition. She is likely to be called away from home for 48 hours at a time, and is always
subject to permanent transfer of station on very short notice. As a married hostess'
home is with her husband, and is not as mobile as when she was unmarried, such a
transfer might jeopardize her marriage. Immobility of an airline stewardess could ser-
iously hamper her employer's ability properly to service its passengers and might en-
danger their safety." Id. at 248. As noted in the text, this argument is beside the point;
the issue in the case was whether the claimant was entitled to unemployment insurance,
not whether marriage disables an airline stewardess from continuing her occupation.
83. Both the Civil Aeronautics Board and Federal Aviation Agency have broad author-
ity over flight crews of air carriers and matters of airline safety. Colorado Anti-Dis-
crimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963) ; 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-
1422 (1964). Detailed regulations regarding certification of flight crew members have
been promulgated. 14 CFR Parts 63, 65. These include medical standards, 14 CFR Part
67, and a requirement that flight attendants be supplied to passengers. 14 CFR §§
121.391, 121.393, 127.145. While any argument based on alleged considerations of safety
must be treated with respect, the absence of any regulation requiring stewardesses to be
unmarried indicates that this particular argument is dubious.
84. There is nothing to prevent an airline from grounding a pregnant stewardess, and
in most States such a layoff would not produce compensable unemployment. But it is
Victorian to contend this is the same thing as discharging a married one.
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rather than that the unemployment produced by such procedures
ought to be noncompensable. Accordingly it is believed that Brown
v. Southern Airways properly may be evaluated, in terms of the
question under discussion, on the same basis as similar decisions
involving female employees in other occupations.8 5
Treated solely as an application of the "voluntary quit" disquali-
fication it is submitted that the general rule set forth above is
unsound. This is true whether one approaches such cases from the
standpoint of the "good cause" requirement or from the stand-
point of inquiry as to whether the separations from employment
involved in such cases are genuinely "voluntary." Note that when
an employer unilaterally has promulgated a rule against retention
in employment of married women he retains the right to revoke
or waive the rule in any case wherein he considers such action
desirable. Hence it is the employer's decision to enforce the rule
which is the effective cause of the separation, rather than the em-
ployee's decision to marry. Obviously it cannot be said in such cases
that the decision to go or stay is solely that of the employee alone,
since if the matter were left to the decision of the employee the
result would be a continuation of employment; and it already has
been pointed out in connection with the retirement cases that unless
a separation from employment is solely the product of the worker's
election it is inaccurate to classify it as voluntary. Such separations
are actually neither "leavings" nor "dismissals" by any accurate
definition; they are simply terminations of employment by mutual
act of the parties, and accordingly ought to result in compensable
unemployment if the claimant meets the test of continued attach-
ment to the labor force.s6
Equally it would seem apparent that the employee has legally
sufficient cause for such an allegedly "voluntary" separation7 re-
gardless of whether the particular State law under which the claim
is filed has a "restricted" or "general" good cause provision. 8 A
more impelling reason, more clearly connected with a worker's
employment, for an asserted "voluntary quit" than the fact a worker
is unable to keep her job because the employer refuses to let her
stay is rather difficult to suggest. Even if one inverts the foregoing
argument and considers the issue of whether there was good cause
85. Similarly disqualifying married female claimants are Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light
Co., 70 Ga. App. 233, 28 S.E.2d 83 (1943) (clerks) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board,
119 Ind. App. 576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949) (clerical workers); Czarnecki v. Board of Re-
view, 185 Pa. Super. 46, 137 A.2d 844 (1958) (factory workers) ; Elliott Co. v. Board of
Review, 180 Pa. Super. 542, 119 A.2d 650 (1956) (secretary) ; Means v. Board of Review,
177 Pa. Super. 410, 110 A.2d 886 (1955) (factory worker).
86. See text to notes 54-57 supra.
87. "Probably everyone would agree . . . that it is reasonable for a woman to marry
even though her employer has a rule against retaining married women." Kempfer, supra
note 50, at 150.
$8. For the distinction, see supra note 1.
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for the separation from the standpoint of the employer rather than
the employee, which appears to be what the decisions on this
question commonly do, the conclusion that the employee has good
cause and the employer normally does not seems clearly in-
dicated. The proposition that any vital or serious interest of a
public utility, factory, or similar establishment is substantially af-
fected by the marriage of billing clerks or stenographers is hard
to defend on a realistic basis. Such rules of employment appear
to have their most common origin in a circumstance unrelated to
the employer's operating requirements. They appear to reflect a
feeling, generally most prevalent in periods when unemployment is
at a high level, that it is unfair to employ a woman with a husband
to keep her at a time when men with families to support are in
need of jobs. This may be suggested as the most logical explanation
of the reason why a substantial number of the cases involve pro-
visions in union contracts.8
It repeatedly has been argued that to discharge a female em-
ployee by reason of her marriage violates the public policy against
enforcement of contracts in restraint of marriage o and also con-
stitutes discrimination against women. 91 The argument based on pub-
lic policy ordinarily has failed because the law of contracts permits
restraints on marriage which are "incidental to another lawful pur-
pose of the bargain. ' ' 92 The claim of discrimination similarly has
been rejected in the cases on the theory women have no legal
right to employment in a particular occupation if the employer
does not wish to hire them.93 It is obvious, however, that the
claim of discrimination will have a more substantial legal basis
89. E.g., Standard Oil v. Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949); Bris-
bin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335 of Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 134 Neb. 517, 279
N.W. 277 (1938) ; Czarnecki v. Board of Review, 185 Pa. Super. 46, 137 A.2d 844 (1958) ;
Elliott Co. v. Board of Review, 180 Pa. Super. 542, 119 A.2d 886 (1955). That such con-
tracts are currently illegal is pointed out in the text discussion infra. As to whether a
union's action in insisting on such a provision is consistent with its duty to fairly repre-
sent its members who are married women, see, Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
231 Wis. 643, 285 N.W. 749 (1939). As to whether the affected employee has an action
for damages against the union, see, Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 282
Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
90. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949) ; Grim-
ison v. Board of Education, 136 Kan. 511, 16 P.2d 492 (1932) ; Note, Marriage, Contracts,
and Public Policy, 54 HARv. L. Rxv. 473 (1941).
91. Grimison v. Board of Education, 136 Kan. 511, 16 P.2d 492 (1932); Ansorge v.
City of Green Bay, 198 Wis. 320, 224 N.W. 119 (1929).
92. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1474 (1962) ; RnSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 581 (1932)
Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 473 (1941).
93. "Plaintiff contends the contract is discriminatory against women .... No con-
stitutional, statutory, or common-law right of any woman would be infringed if the
board refused, for any reason, to employ female teachers. Tender of employment to a
woman may be on such terms as the board may deem to be for the best interests of the
school, and acceptane of terms by an applicant for employment constitutes waiver of the
privilege to object to them . . . . Plaintiff cites some constitutional provisions designed
to secure equality of rights of males and females. None of the cited provisions relates to
discrimination between applicants for employment as teachers .. ." Grimison v. Board of
Education, 186 Kan. 511, 16 P.2d 492. 492-93 (1932).
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in the future. This is because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly
makes it an unlawful employment practice for employers falling
within its coverage-which is, of course, limited-to "discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. ' 94 This provision is sufficient to cover the discharge
of a woman by reason of her marriage. 5 Although administration
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been confined to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission" rather than State employ-
ment security agencies, it seems apparent that future cases involving
this particular employment practice will inevitably take account
of the change of the law, even if only in an oblique fashion. Obvious
anomalies would be created by a holding which disqualified a claim-
ant on the basis of her employer's unlawful action.
IV. PREGNANCY
In the great majority of States explicit and specialized statutory
provisions regulate the eligibility of disqualification for benefits of
pregnant women.9 7 In consequence, cases testing application of the
voluntary quit disqualification to pregnant claimants whose sepa-
rations are required by contract or employer rule occur with rela-
tive infrequency. In at least one State it has been held that the
existence of a specific statutory provision applicable to separations
involving pregnancy renders the voluntary quit disqualification com-
pletely inapplicable to such claimants, on the ground that enact-
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 78 STAT. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1964) (emphasis supplied). For the debate in the House of Representatives over addi-
tion of the word "sex" to the statute, see 110 CONG. REc. 2484-92, 2624-25, 2626-27. The
Senate did not debate on the desirability or meaning of this amendment, which was of-
fered in the House without prior testimony in committee. 100 CONG. REc. 2489 (February
8, 1964) (Remarks of Representative Green). It is interesting to note that a specific
reference to the problems of airline hostesses occurred during the debate. 110 CONG. REC.
2486 (February 8, 1964) (Remarks of Representative Bass). While the reference is not
particularly illuminating, it is obvious the House understood that its action would be
significant with respect to married women. Representative Green of Oregon observed dur-
ing the debate that: "I suppose that this may go down in history as 'women's after-
noon' . . ." 110 CONG. RIc. 2488 (February 8, 1964).
95. "(a) The Equa Employment Opportunity] Commission has determined that an
employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women and which
is not applicable to married men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed
against all females,' but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in
the application of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
(b) It may be that under certain circumstances, such a rule could be justified within the
meaning of Section 703 (a) (1) of Title VII. We express no opinion on this question at
this time except to point out that sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must be
Justified in terms of the peculiar requirements of the particular job and not on the basis
of a general principle such as the desirability of spreading work." 29 CFR § 1604.3.
96. Note, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32
U. CRT. L. Rzv. 430, (1965). See a3so Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. Rav. 788 (1965).
97. For a summary of the statutes see COMPARIsoN OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE LAws § 450.01 (BES. No. U-141, 1965).
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ment of the specific provision as to pregnant claimants indicated
legislative intent to place them in a separate classification to which
the voluntary quit disqualification was inapplicable.9 8 Nevertheless,
at least a few cases deal specifically with the narrow question
whether a separation on account of pregnancy may be classified
as a voluntary quit without good cause where it is required by an
employer's rule or union contract. Such cases provide a striking
contrast to the cases involving marriage discussed in the preceding
section. As indicated in the preceding discussion, the general view
until enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was that a separation
from employment produced by an employer's rule or union con-
tract forbidding retention in employment of married women was a
voluntary quit without good cause. With virtually equal unanimity,
however, those courts which have reached the issue have concluded
that a separation produced by a rule or contract forbidding retention
in employment of pregnant women is not disqualifying. 9 Absent a
specific statutory provision governing the case, the view taken by
such courts has been that such a claimant's entitlement to benefits
depends simply on whether the evidence indicates that the claimant
is in fact able to work and available for work. 100 The opposed lines
of authority involving marriage and pregnancy sometimes exist
concurrently in a single jurisdiction, as in Pennsylvania, 10 1 without
any formal explanation of the difference in result. Although the
fairly obvious relationship between marriage and pregnancy makes
a convincing explanation of the distinction a difficult undertaking,
possibly one answer to the puzzle is that the two types of claimants
are often in differing practical situations when their cases come
before the courts. The newly-married claimant who knew that her
marriage would result in loss of her job has indicated that economic
considerations were a secondary factor in her decision to face
unemployment. On the other hand, loss of wages to a woman facing
unemployment and increased medical expense while awaiting the
birth of a child is a more serious matter, particularly to a claimant
98. Alabama Mills v. Carnley, 44 So.2d 622 (Ala.App. 1949), cert. denied, 253 Ala. 426,
44 So.2d 627 (1950).
99. Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 180
Cal.App.2d 649, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723, hearing denied, 4 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1960), noted 49 CALIF.
L. Rov. 580 (1961) ; Boeing Co. v. Board of Review, 193 Kan. 287, 392 P.2d 904 (1964) ;
Myerson v. Board of Review, 43 N.J. Super. 196, 128 15 (1957); Smith v. Board of
Review, 396 Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492 (1959) Klaniecki v. Board of Review, 177 Pa.Super.
550, 112 A.2d 453 (1955). contra: Rzedski v. Board of Review, 182 Pa. Super. 16, 124 A.2d
651 (1956).
100. Boeing Co. v. Board of Review, 193 Kan. 287, 892 P.2d 904 (1963). To treat the
eligibility of such a claimant as turning on ability to work and availability to work is
consistent with the view taken by Altman, who states that there is "no convincing evi-
dence that employment up to the time of delivery 1i harmfuia provided the physical con-
dition of the woman is satisfactory and the work is suitable." ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR
WoRE 226 (1950).
101. Compare, Smith v. Board of Review, 396 Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492 (1959) with
Czzarnecki v. Board of Review, 186 Pa. Super. 46, 187 A.2d 844 (1958).
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of modest income. Moreover, the pregnant claimant faces difficulties
in securing employment prior to childbirth which are not present
in the case of the newly-married claimant. Pragmatic considera-
tions thus may be suggested as a cause of the anomaly.102
To analyze the pregnancy cases by labored inquiry into whether
pregnancy, and a resultant separation from employment, are acts
or conditions which are "voluntary" or "for good cause" seems
beside the point. It appears preferable to take the view that preg-
nancy is simply part of the normal life-pattern for most of the
female population, and accordingly that concepts of individual vo-
lition and causation are at best of peripheral relevance. To approach
the problem on a different basis has a visible tendency to produce
thoroughly awkward results. The best evidence on the point is
supplied by an Iowa case wherein the Court, earnestly attempting
such an analysis, found itself reduced to the ungraceful conclusion
that the claimant's case had "some analogy to that of one who
deliberately maimed himself to unfit himself for work."'103 That
such an approach is totally inadequate to yield accurate results
appears self-evident.
V. VACATIONS
1. The Problem in General.
Obviously an employee enjoying a paid vacation is not entitled
to unemployment compensation. He is neither unemployed nor in
the ordinary case available for work.'0 4 Moreover his vacation pay
may reasonably-although not necessarily, since the matter is one
of statutory definition-be classified as wages.10 5 In recent years,
however, there has been a steady increase in cases involving claims
for benefits filed by individuals nominally on vacation.106 These cases
reflect the fact that collective bargaining agreements and other
employment contracts commonly stipulate that employees are not
eligible for vacation pay until after completion of a specified
period of employment. When a plant where such an agreement is
102. A more concise statement is that of the Alabama court: "That a valid public
policy exists to support a separate classification of employees who are expectant mothers
is we think clear from the mere statement of the proposition." Alabama Mills v. Carnley,
44 So.2d 622, 626 (Ala.App. 1949), cert. denied, 253 Ala. 426, 44 So.2d 627 (1950).
103. Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d
211, 213 (1948).
104. Kelly v. Administrator, 136 Conn. 482. 72 A.2d 54 (1950). See generally, Annota-
tion, Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Vacation or Holiday or Pay-
ment in Lieu Therof. 30 A.L.R.2d 366 (1953).
105. See, Wellman v. Riley, 95 N.W. 507, 61 A.2d 428 (1949), where a claimant re-
ceived vacation pay after a separation from employment, and was held ineligible in con-
sequence. But o.f. Renown Stove Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
328 Mich. 436, 44 N.W.2d 1 (1950) (where worker had right to take either a paid vaca-
tion or a bonus, at his option, and elected the bonus).
106. It has been suggested the increase derives from the growth of vacation payment
clauses In employment contracts. Annotation, S0 A.L.R.2d 366 (1953).
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in force closes to allow employees to take vacations those employees
ineligible for vacation pay under the contract accordingly find them-
selves without work or wages until the plant reopens. For such
individuals the vacation period thus is the equivalent of a short-
term layoff for lack of work, and the fact they are neither performing
services in employment nor entitled to wages for the period of
vacation brings them within the common statutory definition of
unemployment.
10 7
When persons in the foregoing situation claim benefits, however,
the issue of entitlement arises in sharp fashion. It may be pointed
out that some not-insignificant aspects of the employment relation
obviously persist. The individual usually remains on the employer's
roster of employees and is carried on the payroll in nonpay status.
He normally continues to amass seniority in employment during
the vacation period. He commonly remains eligible for fringe bene-
fits provided by the employment contract, such as care under a
program of employee medical insurance. The time spent in nonpay
status ordinarily will be counted as weeks of service for purposes
of determining his eventual entitlement to a retirement pension.
Not unreasonably, therefore, the ambivalent nature of the claim-
ant's position in the vacation cases has led to vigorous judicial
disagreement as to whether benefits for unemployment should be
paid. As in the retirement cases (which actually grew out of the
vacation cases), the disagreement centers in major part about the
proper scope of a union's agency-i.e., the controversy revolves
about the agency theory.
The cases conveniently may be divided into three groups:
(a) those denying benefits on the basis of the agency
theory;
(b) those which either grant or deny benefits by distin-
guishing between the situation where a vacation layoff
is at the employer's option and the situation where a
vacation layoff is required by collective bargaining
agreement; and
(c) those awarding benefits and repudiating the agency
theory.
2. Cases Denying Benefits on the Agency Theory.
The question of the benefit rights of persons experiencing unpaid
layoffs for vacation purposes first arose in an acute form in a
107. See eupra note 24 and infra note 128.
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Washington case, In re Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co.,1 0 8 decided in
1948. A union and employer entered into an agreement that em-
ployees with a year of service were entitled to an annual one-week
vacation with pay and those with five years were entitled to
two paid vacation weeks. The claimants did not qualify for vaca-
tion pay under this agreement and accordingly claimed benefits
when the employer's plant closed for the vacation period. Treating
the case as one of first impression, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton denied benefits on the theory the unemployment of the claim-
ants was voluntary. The Court reasoned that since the union acted
as the agent of the claimants in agreeing to the contract regarding
vacations the unemployment produced by the operation of the
agreement was consented to by the employees. Having accepted
the benefits of employment under the contract the claimants were
in no position to repudiate the liabilities. "In effect," said the
Court, "the employees secured a leave of absence for the period
of time the mill was shut down."' 0 9
This was a narrowly-based holding devoted almost exclusively
to an application of the agency theory. It may be noted that the
opinion clearly treated voluntary unemployment alone as an ade-
quate basis for denial of benefits, without discussing the application
of the "good cause" provision in the State's law. Nor did the opinion
attempt a genuinely detailed analysis of the scope of a union's
authority to consent to uncompensated unemployment on behalf of
its membership. The Court evidently deemed the existence of such
authority to be nearly self-evident and supported its conclusion with
no more than citation of a single Washington case 110 involving claim-
ant disqualification in connection with a labor dispute.
In subsequent cases a number of additional issues as to the
benefit entitlement of claimants in such situations were developed.
Thus in Maatey v. Board of Review,'" decided by a Pennsylvania
Superior Court within a few weeks of the Buffelen case, it was
argued that such claimants were not actually unemployed. Despite
the admitted fact that they appeared to fall within the definition
of "unemployment" in the statute, the Court suggested the view
that such claimants were not entitled to benefits because the total
108. 32 Wash.2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948).
109. 201 P.2d at 197. Similar statements appear in a number of cases reaching the
same result. See, Mattey v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super.
36, 63 A.2d 429, 431 (1949) ("The effect of the agreement is the same as if claimant
had himself requested time off for a vacation, or other personal reason, and it had been
granted by his employer."); Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn.
52, 47 N.W.2d 449, 452 (1951) ("B~t those specifications indication qualification for bene-
fits would also have been met if Jackson had asked for a two-week layoff and the com-
pany had granted his request.")
110. Appeal of Employees of Poison Lumber & Shingle Mills, 19 Wash.2d 467, 143 P.2d
816 (1943).
111. 164 Pa.Super. 36, 68 A.2d 429 (1949).
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legal relation between employer and employee had not been ter-
minated or suspended by the vacation. Unpaid though it was, the
vacation was merely "a period of freedom from duty but not
the end of employment .... 1112 Moreover it did not appear to the
Pennsylvania Court that the claimant, who had delayed filing
his claim until near the end of the vacation period, had been genu-
inely available for work during the period of his layoff. These con-
siderations were deemed to reinforce the basic conclusion that in
any event the claimant was responsible for his own predicament
since he had, in law, consented to the unpaid vacation layoff through
the agency of his union. The Mattey and Buffelen cases, between
them, presented the case for denial of benefits at its most forceful
posture. They proved widely influential, were followed by a sub-
stantial number of courts, and for several years it would have
been accurate to describe them as representing the prevailing
judicial viewpoint on the problem. " 8
3. Cases Distinguishing Between Layoffs at Employer's Option and
Layoffs Pursuant to Union Contract.
By degrees, however, a further refinement of theory necessarily
occurred. In not every case where disqualification was asserted
were the employers able to establish the requisite consent on the
part of the employee's agent. Thus where an agreement did not
provide for vacations at all, Michigan held that an unpaid layoff
for vacation purposes resulting from an employer's temporary
shutdown of a plant resulted in compensable unemployment 114 A
slightly more complex problem was encountered in a pair of cases
from Indiana and Connecticut construing identical language in a
standard-form collective bargaining agreement.1 5 The contract
terms in both cases provided that if the employer temporarily
shut down any department in its plant during the summer months
it had the option to designate the period of temporary shutdown
as a vacation period for any employees of the closed department
112. 63 A.2d at 431.
113. See, e.g., Adams v. Review Board, 237 Ind. 63, 143 N.E.2d 564 (1957); Moen v.
Director of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N.E.2d 779 (1949); I.M. Dach Un-
derwear Co. v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d 193
(1956) ; Johnson v. La Grange Shoe Corp., 244 Minn. 354, 70 N.W.2d 335 (1955) ; Jack-
son v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951); Naylor
v. Shuron Optical Co., 281 App.Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1952), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 794, 118
118 N.E.2d 816 (1954) ; Glover v. Simmons Co., 17 N.J. 313, 111 A.2d 404 (1955). Mis-
sissippi State Employment Security Commission v. Jackson, 237 Miss. 897, 116 So.2d 830
(1960) ; Philco Corp. v. Board of Review, 175 Pa. Super. 402, 105 A.2d 176 (1953). Note
that many of these cases are now overruled or non-authoritative by reason of corrective
legislation.
114. Hubbard v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 328 Mich. 444, 44
N.W.2d 4 (1950).
115. American Bridge Co. v. Review Board, 121 Ind.App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951);
Schetttno v. Administrator. 138 Conn. 253. 83 A.2d 217 (1951).
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who were "eligible for vacations." 11 Rejecting Massachusetts prec-
edent giving the same language a different reading, 117 both the
Connecticut and Indiana courts held that the contract language gave
the employer authority to designate the period of shutdown as a
vacation period only in the case of those employees "eligible for
vacation"-i.e., entitled to vacation pay."8 Hence when the plants
closed down, employees not eligible for vacation pay were eligible
for unemployment insurance payments for the period of their layoff.
The holdings in these cases, however, involve a significant
ambiguity. These decisions answer only the question whether un-
employment is compensable when produced by a vacation layoff
to which a union has not consented on behalf of a claimant. The
cases do not in terms answer the more fundamental question whether
the worker whose "vacation" is in fact an unpaid layoff is entitled
to compensation where the union's contract with the employer
can be read as purporting to grant consent."" Accordingly, this
line of cases cannot be considered squarely contra to the holdings
exemplified by Buffelen and Mattey. They turn instead on narrow
variations in the facts presented. Possibly the clearest illustration
of this may be gleaned from a dissenting opinion in a Michigan
case which points out acutely that the vacation cases involve not
one type of fact situation but two:
First, those in which an employer orders a shutdown for
his own benefit, and at his own option, for inventory, re-
tooling, in accordance with his usual custom, or other matter
of his own choice. In this situation, since there is to be a
shutdown anyway, why not have the vacations taken then,
also? . . .In contrast to this situation we have the second
• . . that in which a plant-wide shutdown is agreed upon be-
tween employer and union for the purpose of granting
vacations to all alike, whether paid or payless.
120
The point that this approach to the problem is not inconsistent with
a denial of benefits on the basis of the agency theory is graphically
illustrated by an Arizona decision which draws precisely the dis-
tinction above outlined-i.e., "between shutdowns forced by virtue
116. The text of the provision set forth in the Indiana opinion was as follows: "It is
understood and agreed that a period of temporary shutdown in any department for any
reason between May 1 and October 1, unless other periods are mutually agreed upon,
may be designated [by the employer] as comprising the vacation period for any employees
of the department who are eligible for vacations." The Connecticut provision varied only
as to dates.
117. Moen v. Director of Employment Security, 824 Mass. 246, 85 N.E.2d 779 (1949).
118. This is particularly clear in Schettino v. Administrator, the Connecticut case cited
above in note 115, where the claimant was held ineligible for a week in which he re-
ceived vacation pay but was compensated for a week in which he did not.
119. A concurring opinion in American Bridge Co. v. Review Board, 121 Ind. App. 576,
98 N.E.2d 193 (1951), argued that this question was properly before the court and should
have been resolved in favor of the claimant.
120. Smith, J., dissenting in I.M. Dach Underwear Co. v. Michigan Employment Security
Commission, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d 193, 203-05 (1956).
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of the terms of the contract and those which are wholly at the
employer's option" 121 -and denies compensation for a shutdown
provided for by a union contract while implying that shutdowns at
the employer's option produce compensable unemployment. This
case is consistent in its basic theory with the Connecticut and
Indiana decisions above discussed and yet denies compensation
where the other decisions grant it.122
4. Cases Rejecting the Agency Theory and Granting Benefits.
The cases applying the agency theory to deny benefits to claim-
ants on unpaid layoffs for "vacation" purposes soon were followed
by a vigorous reaction. Although the merits of the point of legal
principle involved would have warranted such an outcome in any
case, it seems only fair to say that the subsequent general rejection
of this line of authority owed much to corrective legislation. That
such legislation should be enacted was not particularly surprising,
since the courts which followed the agency theory were in one
important respect asserting a difficult position. Their holdings were
premised on the view that the claimants had given consent to periods
of voluntary unemployment. Unfortunately the claimants (who in
contrast to the claimants in the retirement cases remained long-
term members of the labor force with a continuing interest in labor-
management relations) vehemently denied it.12s Accordingly, as early
as 1949 Massachusetts enacted legislation to reverse a ruling based
on the agency theory; 1 24 in 1951 the Washington legislature amended
121. Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz. 345, 256 P.2d 721, 724 (1953). See also, Thornbrough v.
Schlenker, 228 Ark. 1012, 311 S.W.2d 753 (1958).
122. As Justice Smith pointed out in I.M. Dach Underwear Co. v. Michigan Employment
Security Commission, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d 193, 203 (1956): "Many of these cases,
although reaching contrary results, are perfectly consistent in theory. As a matter of
fact, careful courts in certain of the states, (e.g., Pennsylvania) have held both ways.
They correctly regard their decisions as consistent, not conflicting." Justice Smith pre-
sumably had in mind the contrast between the Mattey case, supra, which denied bene-
fits, and Golubski v. Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 634, 91 A.2d 315 (1952), awarding
benefits on the ground the claimants had never consented to an unpaid layoff for vaca-
tion purposes. Note, however, that analogy with the retirement cases indicates that to
predicate differing results on the basis of the distinction is comparable to the distinction
between mandatory retirement at an employer's option and manatory retirement required
by a union contract. In the cases involving mandatory retirement this distinction does
not produce a difference in result, regardless of whether the jurisdiction grants or denies
benefits. See the text to notes 40 and 74 8upra. Note also that an Individual who accepts
or retains employment knowing that his employer reserves the right to designate vacation
periods at will may be deemed to have "acquiesced" in the employer's right and made it
part of his contract of employment if one accepts the reasoning used in Stream v. Con-
tinental Machines, supra note 41.
123. "Here is a woman who wants work, who needs work, and who has had her Job
taken from her against her will. When she applies for compensation, relying on the
statute enacted for her economic security, she is told that what really happened to her
was that she asked for a vacation and got it. The result warrants searching inquiry.
Whenever the law says that what a person did, legally, is the opposite of what he did
actually, that when he shouted No, what he really (legally) did was to whisper Yes,
then explanation is due our people that they may guard against the evils of clear speech
and forthright expression." Smith, J., dissenting in I.M. Dach Underwear Co. v. Michigan
Employment Security Commission, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d 193, 201 (1956).
124. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 151A, §1(r) (2) (last sentence), enacted in 1949.
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its law to overturn the holding of the Buffelen case; 125 in 1955 the
Pennsylvania legislators set aside the rule of the Mattey case; 12 6 and
similar legislative reversals occurred in New York and Michigan.
127
Moreover, doubt began to be manifested in judicial opinions,
as well. Even those courts which had followed the lead of the
Mattey case, for example, often proved unwilling to agree with
the suggestion in that opinion that the claimants in the vacation
cases were not actually "unemployed" because of the persistence
of some incidents of the employment relation during the layoff
period. 28 It was all too clear that the statutory definitions of
"unemployment" appearing in the various State laws were intended
to preclude this precise type of common-law reasoning. Similarly,
the argument that the claimants in the vacation cases were as a
matter of law unavailable for work began to appear less persuasive
as experience with respect to the problem was acquired. Availability
for work is a particularly individualized matter with respect to
which few broad generalizations are invariably supportable; it turns
fundamentally on subjective attitudes toward acceptance of em-
ployment as manifested by conduct and the degree of an individual's
factual attachment to the labor force. 129 In the vacation cases it
was presently being pointed out that the claimants quite obviously
would have been at work in their regular jobs had the employer's
plant remained open to employ them. Since their unemployment was
not due to any unwillingness to accept work or to any withdrawal
on their part from the labor force they were at least available for
their regular jobs and accordingly fell within the broad group of
workers the employment security system was designed to protect. 1 0
It thus proved possible to answer arguments involving such col-
lateral issues as availability and "unemployment" status.
In 1957, accordingly, New Jersey met the agency theory squarely
125. WAsH. ,Aws 1951, c. 265, §12.
126. Susquehanna Collieries Division v. Bd. of Review, 404 Pa. 527, 172 A.2d 807. 809
(1961).
127. See N.Y. UTrNMp. INs. LAW §591(3)(d), legislatively reversing Naylor v. Shuron
Optical Co., 281 App.Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1952), aff'd 306 N.Y. 794, 118 N.E.2d
216 (1954); Employment Security Commission v. Vulcan Forging Co., 375 Mich. 374, 134
N.W.2d 749 (1965).
128. Thus, although Minnesota denied benefits to claimants experiencing unpaid
"vacations," the Court had no difficulty with this particular issue of statutory construc-
tion. "During the two weeks of the vacation shutdown, Jackson performed no services and
received no wages. The wording of the act and the existing facts place him squarely
within the class defined by the act during those two weeks." Jackson v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, N.W.2d 449, 451 (1951).
129. For general discussion of the availability requirement see Freeman, Able to Work
and Available for 'Work, 55 YALE I.J. 123 (1945).
130. Golubski v. Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 634, 91 A.2d 815 (1952); Schetttno
v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 253, 83 A.2d 217 (1951). Conversely, where workers acting
under a union contract suspended work for a two-week "memorial period" although the
employers Involved in the stoppage kept their establishments open and had work avail-
able, it was properly held that the workers were "unavailable" during the period of the
stoppage. Bedwell v. Review Board, 119 Ind. App. 607, 88 N.E.2d 916 (1949).
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and rejected it in favor of applying the factual matrix rule to the
vacation cases. The New Jersey Court had in 1955 decided Glover
v. Simmons,131 issuing a rather cloudy opinion based on the "public
policy" section of the State's employment security law13 2 in which
it held that a claimant was voluntarily unemployed and hence
ineligible for benefits during a plant shutdown required by a union
contract under which he was ineligible for vacation pay. In 1957
in a pair of companion cases, Watson v. United States Rubber Co."8
and Teichler v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,1 34 the Court overruled
Glover v. Simmons and reversed its prior position.
The eligibility and disqualification provisions [said the
Court] contain nothing which would suggest that advance
consent to a later shutdown is a ground of ineligibility or
disqualification .... Mr. Watson's unemployment during the
shutdown could hardly be said to have been voluntary, for
he had no meaningful freedom of choice; he could not have
rejected the tendered employment with the Rubber Company
without rendering himself ineligible or disqualified for having
refused suitable work, and when the shutdown did occur he
was given no alternative but to accept his layoff or 'vacation'
without pay. . . . Under the clear policy expressed in R.S.
43:21-15, N.J.S.A., his acceptance of employment with knowl-
edge of the prospective layoff or 'vacation' without pay
could in no event be viewed as a lawful waiver of his right
to unemployment benefits under the law. 85
This is, it is submitted, the simplest and most accurate approach
to the problem. It is consistent with the view that entitlement to
benefits under a social insurance program ought not to depend on
the sometimes-dubious language of private agreements. It avoids
the legal fiction inherent in telling claimants they have given legal
agreement to periods of unemployment to which in fact they have
not given consent. Equally, this approach simplifies the issues such
cases present to the courts, and the administrative personnel who
must adjudicate the bulk of the claims, by rendering irrelevant
evidence as to contract negotiations at the inception of the em-
ployment relation and allowing the hearing officers to concentrate
on the far more meaningful evidence as to the facts at the time
of termination. In general it is believed to be the most widely
prevalent view.8 6
131. 17 N.J. 313, 111 A.2d 404 (1955).
132. As pointed out in note 47 supra, such statutes are not Intended to regulate Issues
of eligibility or disqualification but to provide a basis for a holding that the statutes
are constitutional.
133. 24 N.J. 598, 133 A.2d 328 (1957).
134. 24 N.J. 585, 183 A.2d 320 (1957).
135. Watson v. United States Rubber Co., 24 N.J. 598, 133 A.2d 328, 330 (1957).
136. Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603, 393 S.W.2d (1965); Employment Security Com-
mission v. Vulcan Forging Co., 375 Mich. 374, 134 N.W.2d 749 (1965); Susquehanna
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VI. BUMPING
The "bumping" cases arise from the fact that it is common
to find in collective bargaining agreements provisions under which
employees with high seniority may claim jobs held by employees
with lower seniority in order to avert unemployment which other-
wise would affect the high-seniority workers. When a job is claimed
by a high-seniority worker pursuant to such a contract provision,
the low-seniority worker ousted from employment is said to have
been "bumped."
Bumping may occur either on an intra-plant or inter-employer
basis. Intra-plant bumping occurs when a single collective bar-
gaining agreement covers a single plant or employing unit and
confers the right to "bump" only on workers employed by a single
employer. To illustrate, if a plant has 1000 employees and 50 must
be laid off for lack of work, a "bumping" provision in a union
contract will ordinarily operate to require the separation of the
50 employees with the lowest plant seniority. Accordingly, if the
reduction in force in such a case is to be achieved by the closing
of a single department in the plant, the resulting unemployment
will not necessarily be experienced by those individuals employed
in the particular department which the employer has elected to
close. Individuals in the shut-down department who possess sufficient
seniority may claim jobs from workers in other departments and
thus "bump" them from employment. 3 7
Inter-employer bumping occurs when a single union represents
all employees in a particular occupation and locality and has agree-
ments with all employers in the locality requiring them to employ
only union members. In such situations the xinion's contracts with
the employers, or an internal union rule or regulation, may provide
that high-seniority members of the union may claim jobs from low-
seniority members of the union in times of job scarcity. Where
inter-employer bumping exists, a high-seniority worker separated
from the employ of employer A may bump a low-seniority worker
employed by employer B and take his job.
In "bumping" situations the current trend of judicial authority
tends to treat the "bumped" employee as having voluntarily left
employment, and hence as ineligible for unemployment compensa-
tion."18 The argument is that the worker's separation is the product
Collieries Division v. Board of Review, 404 Pa. 527, 172 A.2d 807 (1961) ; Huey v. Texas
Employment Commission, 332 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ; Note, 49 CALI. L. REv.
580, 582 (1961) ; Annotations 90 A.L.R.2d 835, 842 (1963) ; 30 A.L.R.2d 366, 367 (1963).
137. A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, provide for seniority only on a
department-by-department basis. Since "bumping" is essentially a matter of contract,
numerous potential variations exist with respect to "bumping" situations.
138. Blakeslee v. Administrator, 25 Conn. Sup. 290, 203 A.2d 119 (1964) (turning on
the issue of availability for work); O'Donnell v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
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of a clause in the union contract to which he voluntarily assented;
if the union had not insisted on a "bumping" clause in the contract,
the separation would not have occurred. 1 9 Only a single Penn-
sylvania case thus far appears to have analyzed the situation suf-
ficiently to reach the conclusion that if the particular claimant
before the Court had not been separated another worker would have
been, and that accordingly it is not the bumping provision but the
reduction in force which ought to be treated as the true cause of
the claimant's unemployment.
1'4 0
Commentators on the "bumping" cases have almost invariably
deprecated their result,14 1 and it may be suggested that the present
trend of the case-law stems in part from the fact that most of the
reported decisions have concerned only inter-employer bumping in-
volving one or two claimants employed in small business establish-
ments. 14 2 In these situations the true causation of the worker's
unemployment is not readily apparent. Where intra-plant bumping
among employees in large establishments is present, the problem
of causation has not proved so difficult.143 Since the case for com-
pensating such claimants is strong, it may be anticipated that future
cases involving "bumping" will evolve along much the same line
as the vacation cases-i.e., in the direction of greater liberality
toward the claimants. It may be noted that there is some Federal
legislation of relevance in connection with this problem. In enacting
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,'14 which establishes a program
of assistance for workers adversely affected by international trade
concessions operating in part by reference to State-law criteria
of eligibility for unemployment compensation,'145 Congress wrote into
the statute a definition of "adversely affected worker" intended
to provide that where a trade concession causes an adverse effect
56 Del. 162, 166 A.2d 720 (1961); Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 254 Minn. 93, 93
N.W.2d 815 (1958), noted 34 NoTva DAME LAW. 466 (1959) (the leading case); Dubinsky
Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 373 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1963); Kilgore v. Industrial Com-
mission, 337 S.W.2d 91 (Mo.App. 1960).
139. "We conclude . . . that, when a nonmember of a union local knowingly accepts -
or continues-employment with an employer who Is subject to the seniority provisions of
a collective-bargaining agreement with the union local, he thereby ratifies and accepts
the terms of the contract, and, subject to those terms, he constitutes the union his bar-
gaining agent, and Its acts are his acts; and when, upon request of the local's business
agent, he resigns his employment so that a member of the local may claim his Job, his
act of resignation Is voluntary and without good cause attributable to the employ-
er... Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 254 Minn. 93, 93 N.W.2d 815, 821 (1958).
140. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Review, 182 Pa. Super. 491, 128 A.2d 184
(1956).
141. See 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 466 (1959) ; Annotation, 90 A.L.R.2d 835, 842-43 (1963).
142. Three of the five cases cited in note 138 involved motion picture projectionists
whose employment was under exceptionally tight union control.
143. Thus in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Review, 182 Pa. Super. 491, 128
A.2d 184 (1956), where a large plant was involved, the Court analyzed the problem
at some length.
144. 76 STAT. 872 (1962), as amended; 19 U.S.C. §1901 et.seq. (1964).




on employment in a plant a worker ousted from employment in a
division of the plant other than the division directly affected falls
within the group of workers the statute was intended to protect. 4
This is a knowledgeable treatment of the "bumping" problem and
it is submitted a similar result should be reached on principle
under State unemployment compensation laws.
VII. SHARE-THE-WORK PLANS
A relatively new issue concerns the effect on worker entitlement
to benefits of so-called "share-the-work" plans. In Pacific Maritime
Association v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,"7
it was held, notwithstanding arguments predicated on the agency
theory, that seamen were eligible for benefits where a collective
bargaining agreement between their union and an employer's as-
sociation required, in an effort to distribute the available work as
equitably as possible among the union membership, that they be
separated from employment either after completing 60 days on
board ship or one voyage, whichever lasted longer. The seamen
thus separated from employment were required to register at their
union hiring halls and were given renewed employment on other
vessels, as such employment became available, on a rotational
basis. The Court concluded that since the unemployment produced
by this arrangement was involuntary from the standpoint of the
individual worker at the time of job termination there was no basis
for application of California's "voluntary quit" disqualification. The
opinion is a crisp and knowledgeable application of the factual
matrix rule.
In Department of Labor and Industry v. Board of Review'
48
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was almost simultaneously
reaching an opposite conclusion. The employer in Pennsylvania
operated a zipper factory. It proposed to the union representing
its employees a contractual arrangement whereby high-seniority
workers engaged in operating chain machines would be kept at work
from January of each year until they had earned wages of $5,000.
When a worker had earned $5,000, usually by October, the agree-
ment required his layoff and the employment in his place of a
younger worker with lower seniority for the remainder of the year.
In January of the following year the high-seniority workers again
would be returned to their jobs until they had again earned $5,000,
at which time the low-seniority workers again would replace them.
Notwithstanding the fact that Pennsylvania decisions were highly
146. See § 325 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 STAT. 894 (1962); 19 U.S.C. §
1944 (1964).
147. 236 Cal. App.2d 325, 45 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1965).
142. 418 Pa. 471. 211 A.2d 463 (1965). affg 202 Pa. Super. 336, A.2d 310 (1964).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
influential in establishing the factual matrix rule in the first
instance, 14 9 and the additional fact that both the employer and
union argued vigorously that no voluntary leaving was intended or
contemplated, the Court denied benefits to the high-seniority workers
when their separation from employment occurred and they claimed
benefits. The majority of the Court rather plainly felt that the em-
ployer's fundamental purpose was to take advantage of the employ-
ment security program by using it as a device to supplement its
own wage payments to its employees.150 Thus the employer was, in
the view of the majority, using the system as a subsidy.51
Which of the two decisions will ultimately win general accept-
ance is difficult to predict. It is, of course, possible to formally
reconcile them by suggesting that in one case the California court
found the scheme before it to be a good-faith device for spreading
available work as widely as possible and in the other the Penn-
sylvania court concluded that what was present was no more than
a raid on a public fund. Yet such an approach may possess over-
simplified aspects. Pennsylvania's decision was reached by a badly
split court which produced a pair of dissenting opinions sharply
questioning the majority's conclusion on the ground that the theory
it embodied was unsound and without support in the record. There
would have been, argued the dissenters, unemployment among the
workers at the plant involved in any case. The agreement between
the union and the employer did not create the unemployment in
question but merely attempted to regulate and control it as fairly
as possible. 1 52 Moreover, an employer in such a position could achieve
a precisely similar result without bothering to formalize its plan
in a collective bargaining agreement. Layoffs not required by the
terms of a union contract would, on the majority's reasoning, clearly
create compensable unemployment. "Under the rule announced by
the Majority," argued Justice Musmanno, "the appalling situation
results that the worker who is not a member of a labor union may
149. Bee supra note 70'.
150. Thus footnote 12 in the majority opinion stated that: "Obviously what was here
planned was yearly pay of $5,000 plus whatever unemployment compensation sums could
be secured during the period October 1 to December 31 of each year." And footnote 15
of the majority opinion asserted that the unemployment compensation program "was not
created to subsidize such programs to the detriment of eligible beneficiaries and con-
tributing employers."
151. Footnote 16 of the Court's opinion stated: "The record shows that [the em-
ployer involved in the case] contributed at the maximum 4% rate during the years 1960,
1961, and 1962, and that from 1939 through 1962 its total contributions amounted to
$1,822,422 while the total benefits paid to its employees from the fund amounted to
$3,230,752."
152. " 'Spreading the work' in no way creates unemployment- Viewed in terms of un-
employed man hours it neither increased nor decreased unemployment. All it does is to
allow more persons to work over a period of time. Rather than having 50 men con-
tinuously employed and 50 men continuously unemployed all 100 men work part of the
time and are unemployed part of the time." Cohen, J., dissenting in Department of Labor
and Industry v. Board of Review, supro, 211 A.2d at 479.
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receive unemployment benefits which would be denied to a labor
union member." 153 Such commentary as the case has thus far pro-
voked has been to much the same effect. "If there was enough
work in that industry available for all of the members of the avail-
able labor force, the device would not be necessary."''1 These last
points seem sufficiently cogent to warrant a substantial reservation
as to the soundness of the Pennsylvania outcome. Note that the
spread of the guaranteed annual wage may well create additional
situations of this type.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study commenced by outlining three issues characteris-
tically encountered in the constructive voluntary quit cases-the
issues of volition, cause, and the propur scope of the anti-waiver
clause which appears in every State's unemployment insurance
law. 55 The apparent simplicity of these issues, as the preceding
analysis may have indicated, ought not to be allowed to disguise
their true significance; they touch innumerable aspects of the em-
ployment relation, and have roots deep in historic battles of
American law. 5 6
As originally conceived, the statutes pertaining to voluntary
leaving of employment embodied an intentional effort to avoid
narrow concepts of volitional behavior derived from common-law
notions of modem industrial society. 5 7 This is, it may be suggested,
the reason why the "good cause" proviso in such statutes exists
in deliberate conjunction with a reference to voluntary conduct.
The concurrence of the two requirements was meant to pry the
concept of volition free from the grasp of theories relating to undue
influence or duress by requiring consideration of a claimant's total
situation. 15  When this is perceived, the true thrust of such statutes
becomes apparent. They were initially intended to authorize denial
of benefits to an unemployed individual only if a consideration of
all the factors-social, economic, and personal-bearing on his con-
158. 211 A.2d at 474.
154. Silverstone, Shlare-the-Work Unemployment is Not Voluntary Unemployment, 1965
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGAL AFrAmS CoNFERENcE REPORT 11, 27 (Regions I, VI and
VII, El Paso, Texas, 1965).
155. See text to notes 14 and 15 supra.
156. See supra note 17.
167. Compare the rejection of common-law terminology discussed in Asia, Employment
Relation: Common-Law Concept and Legislative Definition, 55 YATE L.J. 76 (1945).
158. "What is 'good cause' must reflect the underlying purpose of the act to relieve
against the distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming paradox of allowing
benefits to an individual whose unemployment is of his own volition disappears when the
context of the words is viewed in that light. The legislature contemplated that when an
individual voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of circumstances which may
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him to do so, the termination of his employ-
ment is involuntary for purposes of the act." Krauss v. A- & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13
N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277, 286 (1953).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
duct at the time of a separation from employment indicated that
the individual possessed a genuine freedom to choose between real-
istically available alternatives and in the exercise of freedom thus
defined elected to become unemployed as a matter of deliberate
personal choice unsupported by any substantial reason. It has been
pointed out earlier in this study that this concept has been realized
only imperfectly, and that in many States there has been a con-
scious decision to restrict the operation of the statute by limiting
the scope of the "good cause" provision. 59 Even in a State possessing
such a restricted variation of the statute, however, it is submitted
that the agency theory provides no basis for a denial of benefifts in
situations of the type under discussion here. The separations in-
volved in no instance result from the worker's own deliberate and
unhampered choice and are, to the contrary, invariably produced
by employer rules or collective bargaining agreements. Thus they
are not produced by considerations personal to the employee, their
cause is to be found in the conditions of his employment and under
the statutes as now written it is submitted they should not result
in disqualification.
159. Su1pra note 1.
